Гитлер, inc. Как Британия и США создавали Третий Рейх.
Шрифт:
1998), p. 515.
28. Frangois-Poncet, Fateful Years, p. 133.
29. Ibid., p. 153.
30. Edmond Vermeil, Germany s Three Reichs. Their History and Culture
(London: Andrew Dakers Limited, 1945), p. 291.
31. Paul Maquenne, Lheresie'economique allemande (Paris: Guerre 39, Union
Latine, 1940), p. 115.
32. Francois-Poncet, Fateful Years, p. 221.
33. Hans Ulrich Thamer, Terzo Reich (Verfuhrung und Gewalt, Deutschland
1933-1945) (Bologna: II Mulino, 1993 [1986]), p. 222.
34. Hjalmar Schacht, My First Seventy-six Years: The Autobiography of Hjalmar
Schacht (London: Alien Wingate, 1955), p. 295.
35. Karl Erich Born, Die Deutsche Bankenkrise 1931, Finanzen und Politik
(Munchen: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1967), p. 118.
36. N. J. Johannsen, A Neglected Point in Connection with Crises (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1971 [1908]), pp. 35, 80; emphasis added.
37. Born, Deutsche Bankenkrise, pp. 174ff.
38. Karl Schiller, Arbeitsbeschaffung und Finanzordnung in Deutschland
(Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt Verlag, 1936), pp. 35-67.
39. Jan Marczewski, Politique monetaire et financiere du III Reich (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1941), p. 58.
40. Kenyon Poole, German Financial Policies 1932-1939 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1939), p. 37.
41. Marczewski, Politique monetaire, pp. 32-3.
42. Poole, German Financial Policies, p. 47.
43. Schacht, Autobiography, p. 297.
44. Gallo, Long Knives, p. 158.
45. Schacht, Autobiography, p. 320.
46. Weitz, Hitler's Banker, p. 157.
47. Norbert Muhlen, Schacht: Hitler's Magician. The Life and Loans of of Dr.
Hjalmar Schacht (New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1939), p. 157.
48. Schacht, Autobiography, p. 302.
49. Peter Padfield, Himmler, ReichsJuhrer-SS (London: Macmillan, 1990),
p. 115.
50. Hitler, Secret Conversations, p. 350.
51. Edward Norman Peterson, Hjalmar Schacht: For and Against Hitler
(Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1954), p. 149; emphasis added.
52. Poole, German Financial Policies, p. 29.
53. R.J. Overy, War and Economy in tfie Third Reich (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1994), p. 38.
54. Otto Nathan, Nazi War Finance and Banking (NBER Paper No. 20,
1944), p. 43.
55. Samuel Lurie, Private Investment in a Controlled Economy (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1947), p. 15.
56. Ibid., pp. 58-9.
57. Thamer, Terzo Reich, p. 414.
58. Avraham Barkai, Nazi Economics. Ideology, Theory and Policy (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1990), p. 165.
59. Hitler, Secret Conversations, p. 372.
60. Poole, German Financial Policies, p. 111.
61. Lurie, Private Investment, p. 36, and Barkai, Nazi Economics, p. 255.
62. Marczewski, Politique monetaire, p. 88.
63. Poole, German Financial Policies, pp. 118-20.
64. Lurie, Private Investment, p. 158.
65. Ibid., p. 59.
66. Ibid., pp. 57-8, 154.
67. Barkai, Nazi Economics, p. 158.
68. Bank of England, OV 34/9, from two memoranda, respectively, by
G. H. S. Pinsent, 6 December 1938 (p. 79), and
69. О very, War and Economy, p. 42.
70. David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution. Class and Status in Nazi
Germany, 1933-1939 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1980 [1966]), pp. 145-8.
71. Schacht, Autobiography, p. 317.
72. Fischer, Nazi Germany, p. 377.
73. Stephen Roberts, The House That Hitler Built (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1938), p. 172.
74. H. W. Arndt, The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties (London:
Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 187-8.
75. Bruno Bettelheim, Leconomie allemande sous le nazisme: un aspect
de la decadence du capitalisme (Paris: Librairie Marcel Riviere et Cie., 1946), p. 180.
i
76. Muhlen, Schacht, pp. 120-35.
77. Weitz, Hitler's Banker, p. 206.
78. Neil Forbes, Doing Business With the Nazis. Britain's Economic and
Financial Relations With Germany, 1931-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 97.
79. Ibid., p. 107.
80. Cleona Lewis, Nazi Europe and World Trade (Washington DC: Brookings
Institution, 1941), p. 16.
81. Forbes, Doing Business, p. 181.
82. Английский банк, Документ 34/201, стр. 10, меморандум, датированный 14 октября 1934 года, в котором говорится о моратории по ценным бумагам, выданным по выделенным до июля 1931 года кредитным линиям (выделено мною.— Г. П.), что можно расценить, как обеспечение для началa нового цикла заимствований германским импортёрам через такие краткосрочные ценные бумаги, которые возобновлялись тотчас после их оплаты.
83. John Gimther, Inside Europe (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938),
p. 99.
84. Forbes, Doing Business, pp. 113, 116.
85. Ibid., pp. 173, 174.
86. Muhlen, Schacht, p. 35.
87. Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (New York: New American
Library, 1966), p. 155.
88. Henry Clay, Lord Norman (London: Macmillan 8c Co., 1957),
pp. 318-22.
89. Dorothy Woodman, Hitler Rearms. An Exposure of Germany's War Plans
(London: John Lane; Bodley Head Limited, 1934), p. 201.
90. John Hargrave, Montagu Norman (New York: Greystone Press, 1942),
p. 218.
91. Ernst Hanfstaengl, Hitler: The Missing Years (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1994 [1957]), p. 204.
92. Anthony Sutton, Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler (Sudbury: Suffolk:
Bloomfield Books, 1976), pp. 15-16.
93. William Dodd, Ambassador Dodd's Diary, 1933-1938 (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941), pp. 166, 170, 176.
94. Bettelheim, Leconomie allemande, p. 78.