Английский язык. Практический курс для решения бизнес-задач
Шрифт:
13. public company – публичная компания
14. subscription n – подписка
subscribe v – подписаться
15. offer price – цена продавца
16. stake n – участие в капитале; ставка, заклад
17. venture n – коммерческое предприятие; рискованное начинание
venture v – рисковать, отважиться, решиться
venture a – венчурный, рискованный
18. malpractice n –
19. replacement value – цена замещения
20. arm’s length – «на расстоянии вытянутой руки» (напр. сделка, проводимая так, что между сторонами нет юридических или финансовых связей во избежание конфликта интересов)
21. free float – число акций в свободном обращении на рынке
22. capital gains – приращение капитала
23. stock exchange – фондовая биржа
24. volatility n – волатильность, переменчивость, неустойчивость
volatile a – волатильный, переменчивый, неустойчивый
25. principal n – номинальная или основная сумма кредита, займа или депозита; принципал, партнер фирмы
26. collusion n – тайный сговор
collude v – вступать в сговор
27. bribe n – взятка
bribe v – давать взятку
28. pay packet – заработок, фонд заработной платы
29. tax burden – налоговое бремя
30. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – валовой внутренний продукт (ВВП)
31. International Monetary Fund (IMF) – Международный валютный фонд (МВФ)
32. malfeasance n – неправомерное действие, должностное преступление
33. coercion n – принуждение, сдерживание силой, физическое давление
coerce v – удерживать, заставлять, принуждать; добиться путем принуждения
coercive a – принудительный
34. insider trading – внутренняя (инсайдерская) торговля
Exercise 1. Answer the following questions.
1. Who is responsible for the day-to-day running of the company? 2. Why did shareholders play a passive role in the affairs of their company in the past? 3. How has shareholding changed recently? 4. How can institutional shareholders influence the affairs of a company? 5. What is the essence of the agency problem? 6. What does the agency theory state? 7. Why might managers do their best to improve the financial performance of their company? 8. Why is the difference in risk attitudes of managers and shareholders? 9. What are the potential sources of conflicts between managers and shareholders? 10. What types of incentives might encourage managers to act in shareholders’ best interests? 11. Why is it believed that managers will always steal from the company they run? 12. Why do shareholders cooperate with corporate robbery? 13. What is the paramount interest of both shareholders and managers? 14. In what way does the Principal-Agent Problem arise in other social interactions? 15. Do you agree with the macroeconomic views of Sam Vaknin, the author of the second text?
Exercise 2*. Find terms in the text that match definitions given below and make sentences of your using these terms.
1. to assume control or ownership; to seize by force or craft
2. one who is not connected with or admitted to a particular association, set or group
3. an undertaking of chance, danger, or hazard, esp. a commercial speculation
4. an association of brokers or dealers in stocks and bonds who trade securities among themselves
5. fickle, apt to change, lively
6. secret agreement for a deceitful or fraudulent purposes, esp. between persons pretending to be adversaries or competitors
7. to induce to a certain course of action, esp. to a wrong course, by the gift or offer of something valued
8. changed from the natural character or original simplicity
Exercise 3. Analyze the potential for conflict between managers and shareholders in Russian companies. Describe a corporate conflict that has happened in Russia.
Exercise 4*. Fill in the blanks using terms given below.
The Boss on the Sidelines
How Auditors, Directors and Lawyers Are Asserting their Power
If anybody needed proof that the…… in Corporate America has……… Maurice R. Greenberg…….. it on March 13. While the imperious chairman and CEO of American International Group Inc. was aboard his yacht on the Florida coast, his company’s……. directors faced an urgent crisis: a growing……. that seemed to lead straight to the CEO. As directors debated whether to cut Greenberg loose, the 79-year-old titan lashed out at them by telephone:
«This board is being….. by a bunch of lawyers who can’t spell the word ‘insurance’! If you get rid of me, you will……. this company!» It was the kind of intimidation that had helped Greenberg….. unprecedented power in his four decades at the…….. of the insurer. But this time, the bullying didn’t work. Within a day, Greenberg, once the most powerful man in the industry, was out as CEO.Greenberg failed to…… the first rule of this new era: that directors, auditors, and….. are more powerful than ever. That shift has fundamentally altered…….. between CEOs and the advisers. At their best, these supposed guardians of……, chosen for their ability to complement the CEO and provide specific areas of……., were trusted counselors. At their worst, they were little more than sycophants. Either way, these advisers – who were always supposed to work for the……… not the CEO – usually……… their power as watchdogs only in moments of genuine crisis. But now the chumminess has given way to a more adversarial…… This new……. has helped to get rid of Boeing CEO Harry C. Stonecipher, Walt Disney CEO Michael D. Eisner, and Hewlett-Packard CEO Carleton S. Fiorina, among others.
The watchdogs are finally facing genuine…….. for their……. The Big Five in the accounting world became the Big Four after prosecutors……. put Arthur Andersen out of business for its role in the Enron scandal. Meanwhile, directors at the……. Houston energy giant and WorldCom are paying off fraud……. from their own pockets.
The result of all this is a climate of fear. Directors….. and lawyers are worried, first and foremost, about protecting their hides. The old attitude of informal…… with the CEO has been replaced by a new spirit of legalistic formality. When red flags arise, directors are quicker than ever to hire…… attorneys to…… potential wrongdoing.